

THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

UC
630
.U551
no. 14

This report was written primarily for the use of the
U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further
reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or
opinions expressed in this report must be considered as

**WIENER NEUSTAEDTER
FLUGZEUGWERKE
WIENER NEUSTADT
AUSTRIA**

This edition has been reproduced by a photolithographic
offset process from the first edition of the report. To expedite
standardize and clarify the printing of this and other
reports, minor changes have been made on the cover, and
some drawings.



AIRCRAFT DIVISION

DATES OF SURVEY:

20 JUNE—4 JULY 1945

FIRST EDITION 28 SEPTEMBER 1945

SECOND EDITION JANUARY 1947

THE UNITED STATES
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WIENER NEUSTADTER
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Forward

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The officers of the Survey were:

opinions expressed in this report must be considered as

limited to the specific material covered and as subject to

further interpretation in the light of further studies

conducted by the Survey.

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.

Harry L. Bowman,

Rensis Likert,

Frank A. McMahon, Jr.,

Paul H. Nitze,

Robert P. Russell,

Fred Searle, Jr.,

Theodore P. Wright, Directors.

Charles C. Cabot, Secretary.

The Table of Organization provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers and 500 enlisted men. The Survey operated from headquarters

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documentary material, including top German government documents; and

conducted interviews and interrogations of thousands of Germans,

including virtually all of the surviving political and military

leaders. Germany was secured for its war records which were found

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Foreword

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt.

The officers of the Survey were:

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.

Henry C. Alexander, Vice-Chairman.

George W. Ball,

Harry L. Bowman,

John K. Galbraith,

Rensis Likert,

Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,

Paul H. Nitze,

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sometimes, but rarely, in places where they ought to have been; sometimes in safe-deposit vaults, often in private houses, in barns, in caves; on one occasion, in a hen house and, on two occasions, in coffins. Targets in Russian-held territory were not available to the Survey.

Some two hundred detailed reports were made. During the course of its work, the Survey rendered interim reports and submitted studies and suggestions in connection with the air operations against Japan.

While the European War was going on, it was necessary, in many cases, to follow closely behind the front; otherwise, vital records might have been irretrievably lost. Survey personnel suffered several casualties, including four killed.

The Survey studied the effects of the air attack on Japan and further reports have been submitted to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERKE AIR FRAMES

PLANT REPORT NO 9

I SUMMARY

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERKE A.G.

WIENER NEUSTADT

AUSTRIA

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WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERK A.G.

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERK A.G.

I. SUMMARY

1. The Wiener Neustadter Flugzeugwerke A.G. at Wiener Neustadt, Austria, was one of the leading producers of the Me-109 single engine fighter. This complex, organized by the German Air Ministry in 1938, was owned and equipped by the state. An output of 750 aircraft per month was scheduled originally for WNF. This was identical to the planned capacity of the Erla and Regensburg plants. The actual production of the WNF complex for the years 1941 through 1944 was 7,509 Me-109s or about 30 per cent of total Me-109 production for that period.

a. The firm originally comprised the two main plants in Wiener Neustadt and a few auxiliary plants. Very extensive dispersals took place after the raids of late 1943 and early 1944. In mid-1944 attempts were made to revert to large units again by utilizing underground sites in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This was accomplished as the war came to an end.

2. Thirteen attacks by the Fifteenth AF were made between 13 August 1943 and 24 August 1944 on WNF plants as follows:

<u>Date of Attack</u>	<u>Plant</u>	<u>Operation</u>
13 August 1943	WNF plants I and II	Fuselage and final assembly. Test flight hanger. Component assembly and jig construction.
1 October 1943	WNF plants I and II	Component assembly. Casting, boiler house. Russian army
2 November 1943	WNF plants I and II	Component and final assembly. Plant II destroyed.
16 January 1944	Klagenfurt plant V	Empennage
12 April 1944	WNF plants I and II Plant III, Fischamend	Final assembly
10 May 1944	WNF plants I and II	

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERK A.G.

24 May 1944	WNF plants I and II	
29 May 1944	Neudoerfl and Rohrbach	Component assembly
30 May 1944	Neudoerfl and Rohrbach	Machining of parts
8 July 1944	Markersdorf	Final assembly
9 August 1944	Gyor	Final assembly
23 August 1944	Brno	Final assembly

II. a. No physical damage assessments were made since the targets could not be visited.

3. Exhibit A shows WNF's production correlated with attacks and dispersals.

a. The first attack reduced production from 270 aircraft in July 1943 to 184 in August, on a rising production schedule.

b. The second attack did little damage but the third attack on 2 November 1943 was catastrophic for WNF. Only 80 planes could be delivered in November and even that fell to 37 aircraft for December 1943.

c. WNF subsequently had a breathing spell during which dispersals began and a fairly rapid recovery was made. In April 1944, 443 Me-109s were produced. The attacks of mid-April and May 1944 again caused serious damage with output dropping to 177 for May as a result.

d. It is difficult to correlate production figures with attacks after October 1944 because of the general breakdown of industry and transportation which occurred throughout Germany at that time. Production fell to 70 in January 1945, rose to 280 in March 1945 and then ceased as the Russian army occupied the area.

e. Compared with Regensburg and Erla, the WNF recuperability was relatively low. This can be attributed to bad management, political interference, inefficiency and tardiness in dispersal, and failure to prepare for the original raids. The German air force considered the Vienna area a comparatively safe one until the attacks of August-November 1943, and prior to that time it had not allotted a great number of fighters or anti-aircraft defenses to the region. The air raid warning system

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERK A.G.

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGSERK A.G.

was equally inefficient with the result that these first three attacks came as a surprise. 49 per cent in 1942, and 34 per cent in 1943.

4. Intelligence generally underestimated WNF production, although we were well informed of the particulars of WNF dispersal. The selection of targets in the WNF complex was good, and the persistency of the raids, plus the fact that attacks were well diffused over the complex, contributed to the severe setbacks in production which the organization suffered.

II THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN ENEMY ECONOMY

1. The WNF complex was one of the two large Messerschmitt licensees charged with production of the Me-109. Its original schedules and equipment called for an eventual production of 750 aircraft per month, the same number as was to be produced by Erla and Regensburg respectively.

2. WNF was established as an autonomous complex capable of producing the complete Me-109, with the exception of landing gear, engine and coolers. However, in the production of some items, its capacity exceeded its own needs and it therefore supplied certain components to other complexes. Thus the WNF plant at Fischamend delivered excess wings to Erla and Messerschmitt, Regensburg, and Voelzlau delivered fuselage sections to Erla. When Opel-Russelsheim was unable to supply the required number of landing gear for Me-109 production, the former Graft and Stitt car factory at Vienna was incorporated into the WNF group. In emergencies which followed bombing attacks or the development of bottlenecks the situation was temporarily reversed, with WNF calling on the others for assistance. For the most part, however, WNF was a supplier rather than a borrower, and its importance in the overall Messerschmitt production was therefore amplified. (The Messerschmitt overall report, Figure 3, indicates the importance of WNF production.)

a. In the years 1941, 1942 and 1943, WNF production exceeded that of Erla or Regensburg. The Air Ministry acceptance figures for the Me-109 are as follows:

	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>Total, 1941-1944</u>
WNF	829	1,303	2,200	3,177	7,509
ERLA	683	875	2,015	4,472	8,045
MESSERSCHMITT- Regensburg	203	486	2,164	6,329	9,182

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERK A.G.

b. It is evident that while WNF continued as a major Me-109 producer, it lost its position in relation to Erla and Messerschmitt, Regensburg, in 1944. Of the total Me-109 production for 1944, WNF contributed but 23 per cent as contrasted to 48 per cent in 1941, 49 per cent in 1942, and 34 per cent in 1943.

3. The air attacks of late 1943 and early 1944 set back production at all three complexes. Erla and Messerschmitt, Regensburg, made spectacular recoveries in the last three quarters of 1944, while WNF remained far behind the others in the general upswing of that year.

4. WNF was organized by the German Air Ministry immediately after the annexation of Austria in 1938. The works were at first installed in the Hirtenberger Flugzeugwerke (WNF plant I) and the Austro-Daimler plant at Wiener Neustadt (WNF plant II). Plant I, which was then engaged in making basic trainers, was converted into a repair depot for Do-17, Ju-52 and He-111, with a repair capacity of 25 aircraft per month.

a. The project to produce the Me-109 at Wiener Neustadt was begun in September 1938 in plant II. At first WNF undertook only assembly of components received from Erla. The first aircraft completed with this outside help rolled from the assembly line in March 1939. The pace of expansion was slow. Thirty aircraft were scheduled for July 1939, but only eight were actually delivered. The plant machine shop was begun late in 1938, and by spring 1939 was meeting almost all plant requirements. A conveyor belt system was installed early in 1942, and shortly thereafter WNF averaged 130 aircraft per month. During 1942, plant I gradually dropped its repair functions and was converted to Me-109 production. Plant II remained the most vital unit in the complex because of its tool processes, machined parts production, presses and components production which supplied all the other units.

b. Between 1939 and 1942 production time dropped from 9,000 to 5,000 man-hours per plane. By late 1942, the WNF complex was recognized as the best organized line producer of Me-109s in the production ring.

c. The various plants in the WNF complex, their locations and the dates of their inclusion in the WNF complex are as follows:

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Plants I and II	Wiener Neustadt	1938
Plant III	Fischamend	1940
Plant V	Klagenfurt	1941
Plant VI	Obergrafeudorf	1941
Plant VII	Zemlin	1941
Plant IV	Brno	1941

All these plants were in production long before the first attack. They are branch and are not to be considered as dispersals.

5. After the attacks of late 1943 plans were made for dispersal, and in the late spring of 1944 production was moved to Hungarian centers and into tunnels in Czechoslovakia. It was not possible to visit the plants during the course of this investigation, and a physical description of them is not available.

III OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

1. WNF was owned by the Bank der Deutschen Luftfahrt, an Air Ministry agency. The plants were under the management of a Mr Steininger who was interviewed for this report.

a. Steininger was formerly with the Auto-Union Company and later with Erla where he was working on a project to produce a low cost commercial aircraft when he was given the job of running WNF on orders from Udet. Steininger took over WNF after Plant II under Mr Bauer had already started production on the Me-109. Bauer remained in charge of Plant II and the important jobs in the overall organization were given by Steininger to favorites and relatives who were often reported as incompetent. Bauer, however, continued to be the most important man in the organization due to his superior technical ability, general foresight and intelligence, but his influence was insufficient to counteract the general incompetence of the rest of the management.

b. The caliber of the management under Steininger was extremely low compared with that of other similarly companies. Steininger rationalized this by complaining about continual interference by the Air Ministry, stating that there was favoritism on the part of Sonderausschuss F-2 (special committee for Messerschmitt airframes) which, he claimed, was always partial to the Messerschmitt owned companies.

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERK A.G.

V. ATTACKS

c. Other officials, however, stated that Steininger was personally to blame for managerial failures. They pointed to his mistakes in judgment, to his over-optimism, his general inefficiency, his lack of courage during air raids when he would hastily leave the area by motor car, and his poor understanding of workers' psychology. An example of this was his movement of the managerial offices to Vienna at a time of crisis, something which impressed the employees as sheer cowardice.

d. Regardless of who was responsible, the fact remains that WNF continually floundered in a sea of managerial blunders. Dispersals were carried out tardily and without adequate planning, materials control was muddled and confused, general policy was unclear, and over-estimates in planning undermined the confidence of the organization in its directors.

IV. EMPLOYEES

1. Total employees in all categories aggregated 23,553 as of 31 January 1945. They were classified as follows:

Category	Number	Per cent
Germans	13,448	52%
Foreigners	10,105	48%
Male	6,184	74%
Female	17,369	26%
Productive	10,363	44%
Nonproductive	13,190	56%

a. The distribution of workers among the various plants, as of the same date, was as follows:

Plants I and II	Wiener Neustadt	11,846
Plant III	Fischamend	2,300
Plant IV	Brno	5,193
Plant V	Klagenfurt	1,826
Plant VI	Obergrafendorf	1,122

Plant III at Zemlin was not operating in January 1945, and it is this deficiency which represents the difference in total employees between the two tables.

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERK A.G.

V ATTACKS

1. The WNF target was attacked 12 times. Six of the attacks were directed against Plants I and II at Wiener Neustadt, and the rest hit various branch plants and dispersals.

a. Attacks on WNF Plants I and II:

13 August 1943
1 October 1943
2 November 1943
12 April 1944
10 May 1944
24 May 1944

b. Attacks on branch plants and dispersals

16 January 1944 Klagenfurt
29 May 1944)
30 May 1944) Neudorf and Rohrbach
8 July 1944 Markersdorf
23 August 1944 "
24 August 1944 Brno

VI PHYSICAL DAMAGE

1. The only information obtained on physical damage was obtained from interviews. No other data is available.

a. The first attack on 13 August 1943 caused only slight damage to Plant II which was the most important unit in the complex. This plant was sprinkled with a few bombs and suffered window damage and destruction of a boiler house. The smashed boiler was immediately replaced with another from a spinning shop about 50 yards away.

- (1) Plant I, which was then engaged in fuselage construction, assembly and flight testing, was hit more severely. Its offices were heavily damaged and the conveyor belts for fuselage and final assembly each received a hit. One small hall in which engine changes were made and one large assembly hall which accounted for 20 per cent of the total output were completely destroyed. This damage was not paralyzing to total production, however, since fuselage construction and final assembly had always been far ahead of other phases of production.

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(2) The remaining damage was negligible and resulted mostly from hits on the airfield and in an adjoining housing area.

(3) Heavy personnel losses were suffered in this raid. Approximately 120 people in the plants were killed and many more injured, including Mr Bauer, the Plant II manager. The high casualty figure was due to the complete surprise of the attack, which caught the majority of the workers still in the plant, the lack of adequate air raid warnings, and the absence of shelters. After this attack air raid shelters were built and the warning system and defences were improved.

b. The second raid on Plants I and II on 1 October 1943 did very little damage. Most of the bombs fell away from the target. Approximately 10 people were killed in the raid. The small damage done was quickly repaired.

c. The attack of 2 November 1943 was the most serious of all. This raid devastated the center of WNF, Plants I and II. In Plant I only one final assembly shop remained standing. It was this attack that made it necessary for the plants to be dispersed.

VII PRODUCTION LOSS

1. Production losses may be summarized after each raid as follows:

a. Attack of 13 August 1943:

(1) In July 1943, WNF produced 270 aircraft. After this raid, production dropped to 184 aircraft in August and 218 in October. Planned production had indicated a gradual rise to an expected 330 aircraft for October.

b. Attack of 1 October 1943:

(1) WNF produced 218 aircraft in October 1943 despite this attack. This is an increase of 17 aircraft over the previous month,

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and in view of the downward revision of the program caused by the first raid it cannot be considered as any appreciable loss.

c. Attack of 2 November 1943:

- (1) This attack, which severely damaged WNF Plants I and II, and the attack on Klagenfurt (empennages) on 1 December 1943 cut down production in a drastic manner in November and December 1943 to a total of 80 and then 37 aircraft for the respective months. Again the program had to be revised downwards so that it could be brought into line with the remaining production potential.

- d. WNF recovered steadily over the next four months. In March 1944 360 aircraft were delivered and, despite an attack in April, the figure for that month totalled 440 aircraft. This is the highest monthly production ever achieved by WNF, and one of the few months in which planned and actual production were at the same level. (The production originally intended for Erla, Regensburg and WNF was 750 aircraft per month.)

e. Attacks of 10 May 1944) WNF Plants I and II
24 May 1944)

25 May 1944) Rohrbach and Neudoerfl
30 May 1944)

- (1) These four attacks must be regarded as one large raid since they had a cumulative effect on production. Following these attacks, production in May dropped from 440 in the previous month to 177 aircraft. This represents an overall loss of 263 planes without consideration of the possible continuing rise scheduled for May. Even the revised schedule for May, calling for 240 aircraft, was 63 planes above actual output.

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f. Attack of 8 July 1944, Markersdorf. (Component assembly and final assembly):

- (1) This attack created a slight setback in the rising production curve. The month of July (351 aircraft) shows a respectable rise over June (254 aircraft.)

g. Attacks of 9 August 1944 Gyor

23 August 1944 Markersdorf

24 August 1944 Brno

- (1) Despite the attacks in August, output rose slightly to 345 aircraft during that month. From September on, output dropped steadily, to a low of 70 aircraft in January, 78 per cent below the August level. Output rose again to 280 planes in March 1945, but this was still far below what output could have been in the absence of bombing. Production plans called for 550 aircraft monthly by November 1944, a figure substantially below earlier plans. On the basis of the new plans (Exhibit I) actual production fell short by 1,973 planes, or 54 per cent of planned production, between September 1944 and March 1945. The deficit was 30 per cent of a level based on output actually attained in August 1944, a benchmark which yields a minimum estimate of output lost.

h. From September on, the loss of output was due to the indirect effects of bombing, particularly to the disruption of the transportation system on which the WNF complex had become more dependent due to dispersals. The attempt to reintegrate production in large underground sites (see below, VII, 4) came too late to counteract the effect of disintegration of the transportation network.

2. The introduction of substitute materials such as plywood (panels, empennage, etc.) was done to shorten production time and because in some cases the material was superior for the purpose. There is no evidence of substitutions being forced on the company because of bombing.

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3. Modifications and changes of models often delayed production. The Me-109E was produced from December 1940 until March 1942, the Me-109F until December 1944, and from then on the Me-109K.

4. The greatest difficulties in overcoming production loss arose when hits were scored on machine shops and processes using machine tools.

VIII DISPERSAL

1. Plans for dispersal were begun after the raid of 1 October 1943. WNF officials held extended conferences with government armament officials of the Vienna area, and finally tentative arrangements were made. From the outset the dispersal plan was considered inadequate by some WNF officials. Most of the alternative plants selected could not be prepared in time to meet the optimistic estimates of the management. Further, some of these plants could not be diverted immediately from the work on which they were already engaged; others were entirely unsuitable for aircraft production, and almost all needed extensive additional installations such as power wiring, transformers, etc., before they could be used. Thus it was impossible to carry out the dispersal as quickly as would have been necessary to maintain production.

2. The supply situation within the complex also became worse during the process of dispersal. Large stocks had been stored in the main plants prior to the attacks. Afterwards these stocks were split up and dispersed. Because of poor management the accounting and stock inventory systems became extremely confused with the result that important semi-fabricated materials, parts and tools could be found only with great difficulty and with much loss of time. Aircraft frequently left the final assembly shop with missing parts lists containing 80 to 90 items.

3. The table on the following page shows the extent and time factor in the dispersal of WNF.

4. In the late spring of 1944, a new dispersal plan was developed. All Me-109 production was to be moved from Wiener Neustadt to Hungarian manufacturing centers and to tunnels in Czechoslovakia. In Hungary an underground location at Kobanya was selected where 500 completed aircraft per month were to be produced by the following organizations:

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERKE A.G.

Manfred Weiss: Component assembly, fuselages,
pressed metal parts, jigs.
Gyor : Wings.
WNF : Components assembly.
Steyr : Engines.

Fuselage assembly was to be shared by Manfred Weiss, Gyor and WNF, with the final assembly done by WNF.

a. Of the 500 aircraft produced monthly, the Hungarian air force was to receive 20 per cent and the German air force the remainder. A similar project was planned for Czechoslovakia production centers with a planned production of 300 aircraft per month. (Exhibits B and C show the plant layout for the Gyor works in Hungary.)

b. These underground projects were an attempt to bring production safely back into larger units. The Air Ministry order to disperse into units each of which would produce no more than 150 aircraft per month severely cut into the industry's efficiency. This was due mainly to the difficulty of distributing both skilled labor and tools to many dispersed sites. The attacks on transportation added to the difficulties of maintaining many small dispersed units.

Product	Dispersed from	Dispersed to	Date project started	Date of 100% production
Test flight	Wiener Neustadt	Zwoelfaxing	Oct 1943	Dec 1943
Machining	" "	Rohrbach	Nov 1943	Jan 1944
Jig construction	" "	Kottingbrunn	Nov 1943	Jan 1944
Fuselage assembly	" "	Weigelsdorf	Nov 1943	Feb 1944
Final assembly	" "	Voeslau	Dec 1943	Feb 1944
Component assembly	" "	Voeslau	Dec 1943	Feb 1944
Component assembly	" "	Neudoerfl	Jan 1944*	Feb 1944
Machining	Rohrbach	Breitenau	Feb 1944**	Mar 1944
Fuselage assembly	Wiener Neustadt	Waldeck	Mar 1944	Mar 1944

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERKE A.G.

<u>Product</u>	<u>Dispersed from</u>	<u>Dispersed to</u>	<u>Date project started</u>	<u>Date of 100% prod-uction</u>
Fuselage assembly	Wiener Neustadt	Lutein(C.S.R.)	Apr 1944	May 1944
Wings	Fischamend	Schwadorf	Apr 1944***	May 1944
Jigs	Fischamend	Ebergassing	Apr 1944***	May 1944
Wings	Fischamend	Tischnowitz	Apr 1944***	May 1944
Component assembly	Wiener Neustadt	Lutein	Apr 1944	May 1944
Component assembly	Vooslau	Markersdorf	May 1944	Jun 1944
Final assembly	Vooslau	Markersdrof	May 1944	Jun 1944
Wings and components	Zemling	Kobanya	May 1944	Jun 1944
		Rohrbach	Jun 1944	Jul 1944
Machining	Rohrbach	Spinnerei		
		Rohrbach	Jun 1944	Jul 1944
Machining	Rohrbach	Tunnel		
Machining	Rohrbach	"Project S"	Jun 1944	Jun 1944
Wings	Schwadorf	Tischnowitz	Jun 1944	Jul 1944
Jigs	Ebergassing	Tischnowitz	Jun 1944	Jul 1944
Wings	Fischamend	Tischnowitz	Jun 1944	Jul 1944
Assembly	Wiener Neustadt	Olmuetz	Jul 1944	Jul 1944

* Wolfberg tunnel was originally built for the Reichsautobahn near Spittal/Drau.

** This dispersal was a pre-raid dispersal to minimize prospective air raid damage.

*** These were intermediate dispersals, and the plants were later to be moved to Tischnowitz.

c. The Hungarian underground site became operative, but its production never reached the planned figure of 500 aircraft per month.

IX INTELLIGENCE CHECK

1. Allied Intelligence was well informed of the location and nature of the various WNF dispersals, and the selection of units to be bombed was generally good. However, in most instances, our estimates of production losses proved very inaccurate.

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERKE A.G.

X EVALUATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

1. As this plant could not be visited, many evaluations could not be made. From the various interrogations and reports available, it is evident that the inefficiency and incompetence of the management seriously impeded production at WNF. Delay in dispersing operations and in providing air raid protection for the workers also contributed to loss of production.

4 - Liaison arrangement with Messerschmitt's relating to WNF and others.

5 - Isolated vertical photograph of Wiener Neustädter Flugzeugwerke P.O.B. 2.

6 - Photo interpretation report K 1572, 15 October 1943 (Damage Assessment, Wiener Neustadt.)

(Reference items are filed with the Records of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, War Department, Washington, D.C., care of the Adjutant General).

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EXHIBIT A

LIST OF REFERENCE NOTES

ITEM NUMBER

- 1 - Copy of report by office manager Brasov concerning air attacks on Kronstadt.
- 2 - Report on Hungary as contributing to the German aircraft.
- 3 - Report of daylight attacks on WNF during August 1943.
- 4 - Licensee arrangement with Messerschmitt as relating to WNF and others.
- 5 - Annotated vertical photograph of Wiener Neustadter Flugzeugwerke G.m.b.H.
- 6 - Photo interpretation report K 1872, 15 October 1943 (Damage Assessment, Wiener Neustadt.)

PRODUCTION, ATTACKS AND DISPERSALS

(Reference items are filed with the Records of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, War Department, Washington, D.C., care of the Adjutant General).

ACKS

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERKE A.G.

EXHIBIT A

TEST FLIGHT TO TWOLF BRING
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO RUMERACK
RE CONSTRUCTION TO RUMERACK
FORELAGE TO WEISSELDOORF
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO BLUG 10
FINAL ASSEMBLY TO VORSLAV
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO VORSLAV
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO VORSLAV
INFERRAGE TO WOLFRERS-TUNNEL
INFERRAGE TO LUTTEIN
WINGS TO "OBJECT 27 80"
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO LUTTEIN
FORELAGE TO "OBJECT 27 A"
FINAL ASSEMBLY TO MARKENBERG
SLO 2 TROLE TO KESANTO
SLOAN DISPENSE TO KESANTO
FINAL ASSEMBLY TO KESANTO
RE-DISPENSE OF FINAL ASSEMBLY
TO WNE

ON, SEE TEXT TABLE, SECTION I,

300

CTION CURVE BEFORE BOMBING, WERE

PRODUCTION, ATTACKS AND DISPERSALS

AGE OF WEATHER,
THE A/C TO ANOTHER,
T, ENGINES


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
DATA
YEAR

EXHIBIT A

WNF ACTUAL & PLANNED PRODUCTION RELAT DISPERSALS AND MODEL CH.



ED PRODUCTION RELATED TO AIR ATTACKS RSALS AND MODEL CHANGES



NOTES:

- A. FROM 1-11-43 TO 20-12-43
- B FROM 20-11-43 TO 10-1-44
- C FROM 20-11-43 TO 15-1-44
- D FROM 20-11-43 TO 13-1-44
- E FROM 25-11-43 TO 5-1-44
- F FROM 18-12-43 TO 10-2-44
- G FROM 28-12-43 TO 1-2-44
- H FROM 10-1-44 TO 27-2-44
- J FROM 8-2-44 TO 27-3-44
- K FROM 10-4-44 TO 1-6-44
- L FROM 10-4-44 TO 26-5-44
- M FROM 20-4-44 TO 12-6-44
- N FROM 1-5-44 TO 20-6-44
- O FROM 12-5-44 TO 30-6-44
- P FROM 25-5-44 TO 16-7-44
- Q FROM 12-6-44 TO 2-8-44
- R FROM 18-6-44 TO 10-8-44
- S FROM 1-7-44 TO 25-8-44

1.
TEST FLIGHT TO ZWÖLF AXING
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO ROHRBACH
JIG CONSTRUCTION TO KOTTINGBRUNN
FUSELAGE TO WEIGELSDORF
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO BLOG. 10
FINAL ASSEMBLY TO VÖSLAU
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO VÖSLAU
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO NEUDÖRF
EMPENNAGE TO WOLFSBERG-TUNNEL
FUSELAGE TO LUTTEIN
WINGS TO "OBJECT 217 BC"
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TO LUTTEIN
FUSELAGE TO "OBJECT 217 A"
FINAL ASSEMBLY TO MARKERSDORF
JIGS & TOOLS TO KÖBANYO
SEMLIN DISPERSED TO KÖBANYO
FINAL ASSEMBLY TO BRNA, OYÁR, OLMUTZ
RE-DISPERSED OF FINAL ASSEMBLY
TO W.N.F.

2.

FOR DESCRIPTION OF AIR RAIDS, SEE TEXT TABLE, SECTION I,
PARAGRAPH 2.

3.

THE FLUCTUATIONS OF THE PRODUCTION CURVE BEFORE BOMBING, WERE
DUE TO:

NO TEST FLIGHTS BECAUSE OF WEATHER,
CHANGING FROM ONE TYPE A/C TO ANOTHER
CHANGE OF ARMAMENT, ENGINES

☛ = AIR RAIDS

EXHIBIT A


WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERKE A.G.

EXHIBIT B

BOMB DAMAGE TO WNF PLANT SITE AT GYOR, HUNGARY


LEGEND

- ▨ 146
- ▨ 1B (FIRE)
- ▨ 1E #10
- BUILDINGS
- E EQUIPMENT



LEGEND

-  HE
-  IB (FIRE)
-  HE & IB
- G BUILDINGS
- E EQUIPMENT



STOCK-ROOM
100% MAT. 60%

AL-ASSEMBLY
100% E. 40%

PART ERECTION
E. 60%

ATORY STEPS
RODUCTION
E. 60%

TESTING BLOCKS 10%

REPAIR
E. 30%

RAILROAD
CAR-SHOP
G. 10% E. 10%

FORGE

POWER
STATION

LABOR-
TORY

COMPONENT & PART ASSEMBLY ME 109
G. 30% E. 10-20%

AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION
G. 10% E. 10%

ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICES FOR
A/C PRODUCTION
50%

AUTOMOBILE
PRODUCTION
10%

GARAGES
10%

AUTOMOBILE
PRODUCTION
10%

WOOD STORAGE

BRIDGE-BUILDING AREA
5-10%
80% DESTROYED IN A LATER ATTACK

DIRECTION
OF ATTACK

NOT WNF

GASOLINE REFINERIES
100%

GAS
100%

WORKS
100%

GYÖR - BUUDAPEST

DAMAGE TO WNF PLANT
GYÖR, HUNGARY

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY


WIENER NEUDSTADTER
EXHIBIT B

WIENER NEUSTADTER FLUGZEUGWERKE A.G.

EXHIBIT C

BOMB DAMAGE TO WNF TEST FIELD AT GYOR, HUNGARY

THE EFFECT
LEGEND



FINAL AREA



HE COMPONENT
BOILER-HOUSE
FINAL AREA
HALLS
FIRING RANGE
COMCAST ENGINE
AIRFIELD
AIR-RAID SHED

STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

WIENER NEUSTADTER

EXHIBIT C



AIR-FIELD

○ COMPASS-SWINGING DEVICE

HE EFFECTS
LEGEND



	APRIL 1944 ATTACK		SEPT. 1944 ATTACK	
	DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS	EQUIPMENT	DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS	EQUIPMENT
AIR COMPONENTS	10%	5%	30%	5%
BOILER-HOUSE	0%	—	100%	50-60%
FINAL ASS'Y	10%	5%	30%	5%
HANGARS	10-20%	5%	50%	10%
FIRING RANGE	5%	—	30%	—
COMPASS-SWINGING	0%	0%	0%	0%
AIRFIELD	10%	10%	20%	20%
AIR-RAID SHELTERS	0%	0%	2%	—

FIRING RANGE



HANGARS USED FOR TEST FLIGHT

FINAL ASS'Y



AIR COMPONENTS



AIR-RAID SHELTER



AIR-RAID SHELTER



BOILER-HOUSE



BOMB DAMAGE TO WNF TEST FIELD
GYOR, HUNGARY

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
WIENER NEUDSTADTER
EXHIBIT C



AIR-FIELD



HE EFFECTS

LEGEND



HE

FIRING RANGE



HANGARS

MJR. COMPONENTS

BOILER-HOUSE

FINAL ASS'Y

HANGARS

FIRING RANGE

COMPASS-SWING

AIRFIELD

AIR-RAID SHELTERS

APRIL, 1944 ATTACK

DAMAGE TO:

BUILDINGS EQUIPMENT

10%

5%

0%

10%

5%

10-20%

5%

5%

—

0%

0%

10%

10%

0%

0%

SEPT., 1944 ATTACK

DAMAGE TO:

BUILDINGS EQUIPMENT

30%

5%

100%

50-60%

30%

5%

50%

10%

30%

—

0%

0%

20%

20%

2%

MJR. COMPONENTS



AIR-RAID SHELTERS


BOMB DAMAGE

GYOR

AIR-FIELD

○ *COMPASS-SWINGING DEVICE*

UGE




HANGARS USED FOR TEST FLIGHT

MJR. COMPONENTS



AIR-RAID SHELTER



FINAL ASS'Y



AIR-RAID SHELTER



BOILER-HOUSE

**BOMB DAMAGE TO WNF TEST FIELD
GYOR, HUNGARY**

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

WIENER NEUDSTADTER
EXHIBIT C